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I Introduction 
In this chapter we will attempt to develop a conceptual framework for clusters of 
SMEs, mainly based on the insights of Penrose and Richardson. Building on this 
framework, we will then move on to examine the effect of clusters on 
competitiveness, and we will “test” our ideas in the context of a country-wide project 
aimed to support the creation of clusters in Greece.   
II  Small firms and clusters in theory and practice 
Small firms, including clusters of small firms, are being given an increasing share of 
attention in the economics literature lately. However, despite attempts to provide a 
theoretical backing of policies focussing on small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and clusters, there is still scope for attempting to provide an integrative 
conceptual framework to inform and/or improve policy on SMEs and SME clusters. 
In what follows we will attempt to sketch the basis for an integrative conceptual 
framework on clusters of SMEs (and importantly the inner workings of clusters), 
mainly based on Richardsonian and Penrosean insights. 
We begin with a general discussion of SMES and clusters. SMEs are usually defined 
according to the number of employees, although there are countries which also take 
into account some financial indicators, the sector of activity, and/or the percentage of 
shares held by other enterprises.
† However defined, there are considerable differences 
                                                 
* We are grateful to Roger Sugden and Jamie Wilson for comments and discussion. We are also 
grateful to a large number of managing directors of the “clusters” we examined. 
 
† For detailed SME definitions in many countries, see Asia-Europe SME Conference (1998). For an 
overview see Bianchi and Tomasso (1998: 11-12). Here we adopt the definitions set by the EU, which 
identifies three categories of SMEs: medium-sized (50-250 employees), small (10-49 employees) and 
micro-enterprises (1-9 employees). Small firms’ turnover should not exceed €10 million, and that of 
medium-sized ones should not exceed €40 million. Further, the firms should meet the independence 
criterion, i.e. no more than 25% of their equity should be held by non-SMEs (see, for definitions, data 
and more details, Capaldo et al. (1998) and <www.europa.int>).   2
                                                
among SMES. There are differences in, among others, the market reach of SMEs 
(local vs national vs international); the “atmosphere” within which they operate 
(declining regions vs innovative and continuously improving regions); and the state of 
technology and product life-cycle (traditional sectors/saturated markets vs high-tech 
/fast changing sectors). 
What accounts for SME size? You (1995) is one of very few providing a survey of 
small firms in economic theory as an attempt to pinpoint the basis of a theory of the 
determinants of (small) firm size. He suggests that available neoclassical, transaction 
costs, industrial organisation and evolutionary models each provide useful insights on 
the determinants of size and the size distributions of firms in an industry or an 
economy, and also on inter- and intra-country differences.  
Based on insights from all these models, You (1995) proposes seven factors that 
would account for small size and, consequently, the growth of the small firm sector in 
an economy. 
1.  A structural effect. That is, deindustrialisation or expansion of the service 
sector may result in a large share of small firms in an economy. 
2.  A macroeconomic effect. That is, the small firm sector is more likely to expand 
during economic downturns. 
3.  A change in technology. A reduction of the necessary minimum efficient scale, 
or the reduction of asset specificities (dedicated assets), will tend to favour 
smaller firm size. 
4.  A change in the market environment. For example, an increase in uncertainty 
facing firms will increase returns to flexibility, thus (as small firms tend to be 
more flexible) will increase the share of small firms in an economy. 
5.  A change in the factor markets. The small firm sector will increase with an 
increase in available funding or finance for them. 
6.  A change in tastes. That is, a shift of demand towards more sophisticated 
products will increase the available “interstices” for small firms in the 
economy. 
7.  A change in the strategies of large firms. For example, high pricing strategies 
or restructuring of firms increase the available “interstices” in the economy for 
small firms. 
You, however, fails to consider transaction costs and/or resource-competence related 
factors, which may also be of relevance, see below. Policy interest in SMEs can be 
more fully explained by considering the advantages associated with small firm size. 
To name but a few, small firm size is associated with increased flexibility within the 
economy.
‡ They are considered more suited to meet continuously changing demand 
conditions. SMEs have been associated with the potential for increased 
 
‡ In downturns, or during demand fluctuations, SMES may serve as a cushion to larger firms that 
subcontract part of their production process to them. Therefore, it may be crucial for some SMES to 
employ flexible labour practices in order to survive. See Lucas (1978) for a mainstream treatment 
supporting this, as well as Piore and Sabel (1984) for their emphasis on small firm flexibility as a 
survival determinant in the face of increased uncertainty. See also Richardson (2003) on inter-firm 
specialisation in the economy and the importance of general purpose intermediate products.    3
                                                
innovativeness. SMEs also account for a large amount of total employment in the 
economy. The may also provide a seedbed for the creation of larger firms in the 
future.
§ Further, small firm size allows a more democratic process of decision making 
by firms and avoids the problems of practices exercised by larger corporations (e.g. 
divide-and-rule practices, abuse of market power), see Pseiridis (2001) for an 
extensive account.
** Deindustrialisation processes, taking place especially in 
countries mainly dominated by large (multinational) corporations, such as Britain and 
the USA, and the emergence of “new competition” (Best, 1990), may question the 
long-term prospects of development based on a focus on large (multinational) firms.
†† 
      
The above help explain why policies with regard to SMES, co-operation and clusters 
have recently become an essential part of an industrial development agenda, notably 
within the EU. However, arguments for support of SMEs, and especially clusters of 
SMEs, are still rather impressionistic, they do not derive from a coherent conceptual 
framework.  
In what follows we will attempt to point out relevant difficulties in relying on 
traditional economic theory for the creation of a conceptual framework for clusters.
‡‡
First, mainstream neoclassical theory does not seem to accommodate positive 
insights/connotations on firm co-operation and clusters other than co-operation as 
collusion. Industrial Organisation (IO) literature is basically concerned with market 
power (and the associated monopoly profit associated), and strategies of incumbent 
firms in imperfectly competitive market structures to maintain that power. It is less 
concerned with the process of jointly setting and improving conditions for efficient 
production or for effective innovation-led profitability and growth. 
 
§ Penrose (1959) calls “interstices” the small segments of a market where the entrepreneurs see and are 
able to exploit productive opportunities, see also Penrose (1959, 1996) on limits to size. Best (1990: 
207) suggests that the rate of creation of new firms, especially those which emerge in response to 
Penrosean interstices within an industrial district, is an index of the district’s dynamism and health. For 
an account on firm growth, on the process of concentration, and on the opportunities for smaller firms 
in the upswings of the business cycle, see Penrose (1959: 215-265). 
** For a number of case studies on firm practices, see Martin (1989) and Crystal and Lipsey (1997). 
Also, a lot has been written on “competitive bidding” of governments to attract TNCs, a game played 
among uneven participants, see Pitelis (1994) for an overview and also Cowling and Sugden (1994; 
1999). See also the Chapter by Gilly and Perrat in this volume, where they discuss the intricate 
governance dynamics that occur between local and global territorial scales. See also Sugden (1996) 
and Cowling and Sugden (1999) on multinational webs (defined as webs of smaller firms which cross 
national borders), and also Bianchi and Tomasso (1998: 18-24) on the importance of “openness” and 
transnational networks. 
†† On deindustrialisation and relative economic decline, see Singh (1977), Blackaby (1979), Bluestone 
and Harrison (1982), Martin and Rowthorn (1986), Rowthorn and Wells (1987), Pitelis (1993), and 
The Economic Journal (1996, 1997). It is argued that industrial development based on large firms may 
contain inherent strategic failures relating to the number asymmetry between people taking decisions 
and those affected by them (Cowling and Sugden 1994; Sugden, 1996; and Cowling and Tomlinson 
(2000), for the case of Japan). For a related discussion of strategic failure, in the context of ‘clusters’, 
see also the Chapter in this volume by Sugden et al.. 
‡‡ Similarly to Sugden et al. in chapter XX, we take clusters as a broad category which includes 
industrial districts, inter-firm networks, Japanese industrial policy cartels, webs, or related institutions, 
such as industrial parks, etc..   4
                                                
Interestingly, there are some seeds for a conceptual framework on inter-firm co-
operation in the transaction costs approach. In Williamson (1975), for example, there 
are four alternative ways (governance modes) of efficiently organising/co-ordinating 
transactions; the firm (unified governance), co-operation (contractual governance or 
“promise”), planning, or market. The nature of each transaction defines the 
appropriate (most efficient) governance mode. Thus when opportunism is absent, 
inter-firm co-operation emerges as the appropriate firm choice, and trust gains 
importance as a determinant of mutual firm success.
§§  
Importantly, some SMEs seem to operate alone (i.e. carrying out the full set of 
activities needed for the production of their “final” product), while others may be 
linked, by one way of co-operation or another, with other, small or large, firms, 
effectively being a part of a co-ordinated chain of activities, in some cases also 
providing some or all of the co-ordination needed for the production of a “final” 
product. Researchers seem to acknowledge that horizontal or vertical linkages 
between firms and the existence of collocated “neighbouring” sectors are important 
contributing factors to firm and regional competitiveness, see e.g. Porter (1990; 
1998a; 1998b), Pouder and St John (1996), Tallman et al (2004), Inkpen and Tsang 
(2005)This idea has spilled-off to the policy makers. Thus support for SMES has been 
extended, especially during the 1990s, to encompass support for the creation of 
linkages and agglomerations of (mainly) SMES, as a way to create and maintain 
competitive advantage for participating firms and regions.  
Various terms and definitions have been used to describe this phenomenon of 
agglomerations of inter-linked firms (e.g. clusters, industrial districts, innovative 
milieux, etc.). Each of them seems to provide interesting insight on specific aspects of 
this phenomenon. Here we adopt the term “clusters”, defined as follows, which we 
believe embraces all the elements that are important for our description and analysis: 
 “Clusters are agglomerations of firms in a particular activity, usually with a 
geographical dimension, with horizontal and (preferably also) vertical intra- and 
(preferably) inter-sectoral linkages in the context of a facilitatory socio-
institutional setting, which co-operate and compete (co-opete) in (inter)national 
markets.” (Pitelis, 2001).  
The potential advantages of clusters vis-à-vis larger firms has been the object of 
inquiry of several researchers. This body of literature dates back to Marshall (1920) 
and especially his treatment of the industrial districts and the industrial “atmosphere”.  
Marshall examined industrial districts as geographically defined (localised) socio-
economic systems of production, mainly made up of (specialised) SMES. It is not 
necessary that the district has a single specialisation, indeed the existence of multiple 
fields of specialisation can be essential in living through crises as well as an engine 
for progress. Most importantly, successful industrial districts have, by virtue of their 
openness and adaptability, the ability to renew their knowledge base, and thus 
maintain high growth rates. 
Marshall viewed the industrial district as greater than the sum of its parts, and 
highlighted increased specialisation, external economies and collective efficiency as 
 
§§ For a detailed analysis of trust, and in particular it’s relationship with proximity, see Dupuy and 
Torre in this volume.   5
                                                
factors that are conducive to the industrial district’s growth. These factors provide to 
the district the ability to compete with other forms of (big business) industrial 
systems. Of central importance to the district’s growth are tacit knowledge (which is 
aided by the type of organisation), interaction of humans, firm flexibility and also 
social factors, such as the “local spirit” (1920, Book I, ch. 2, pp. 20), industrial 
atmosphere, need for peer recognition, etc.. In sum, industrial districts, favoured by 
the existence of external economies and accommodating interactive and cumulative 
innovation processes, may constitute an efficient industrial structure. Marshall, 
however, did not fail to highlight the possible threats to the growth of an industrial 
district, especially the risk of institutional inertia, which may be inherent in a district, 
and behold the district from continuously adapting to new activities, innovating, 
outliving radical changes, and generally anticipating the future. 
Following a long silence, the academic community rose to the challeng of clusters. 
Bagnasco (1977) was arguably the first of a series of researchers who attempted to 
cast light on industrial districts in north-central and north-east Italy as meritable 
industrial structures.
*** Becattini (1979)highlighted a shift of emphasis from industrial 
sectors to industrial districts (often comprising more than one industrial sector) as 
units of analysis.  
Many contributions thereafter centred on describing and explaining the Italian 
paradigm of industrial district. Industrial districts in Third Italy cover product areas as 
diverse as clothing and footwear, ceramic tiles and automated packaging machinery. 
Of the most extensively analysed regions is Emilia-Romagna, especially because it 
has the highest per capita income in the whole of Italy, and an extremely small firm 
size (average of about five workers per firm), see Brusco (1982), Brusco and Righi 
(1989), and Lazerson (1990) among others.  
However, industrial districts of various types abound in much of the industrialised 
world as well. In almost every part of the world there is a history of rise (and 
sometimes decline) of industrial structures similar to the Italian industrial districts. 
The USA, the UK, Denmark, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain and also Brazil, India 
and elsewhere feature notable examples; see, among others, Piore and Sabel (1984), 
Sabel and Zeitlin (1985), Schmitz and Musyck (1994), and Pseiridis (2001).  
All the above provided extensive descriptions, analyses, typologies, and/or 
classifications of various observed forms of clusters in various countries. This trend 
has been embraced by the neoclassical camp as well, with the most notable 
contributions those featuring a focus on location economics and economic geography 
(see, e.g., Krugman 1991b, 1998a, 1998b; Audretsch, 1998).  
Many typologies of industrial districts have been suggested. One of the most 
influential has been Piore and Sabel (1984), who examine industrial districts of the 
19
th and early 20
th centuries and argue that these districts shared three mutually 
dependent characteristics. First, they produced a highly differentiated range of 
products for regional and/or foreign markets, and they also engaged in constant 
alteration of their products, partly in response to changing market tastes, partly to 
 
*** Bagnasco coined the term Terza Italia [Third Italy], to distinguish the area of north-central and 
north-east Italy from the south of the country and from the heavy industrial area in the north-west. 
Third Italy comprises the regions of Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Umbria, Marche, Veneto, Friuli-
Venezia-Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige.   6
                                                
shape market tastes and create new markets. Second, the technology employed by 
firms in these industrial districts could be used in various ways and for various 
products. Apart from the development and the efficient introduction of new 
technologies, these districts’ vitality has also been reflected in the “...speed and 
sophistication with which they adapted power sources to their needs” (1984: 31). 
Third, in these districts, and in order to encourage permanent innovation, regional 
institutions were created aimed at balancing competition and co-operation between 
firms.
†††
Despite the mass adoption of mass production principles by governments after World 
War II, Piore and Sabel argue that “flexible specialisation” could re-emerge in our 
times (1984: 282), and suggest it as a way to deal with economic downturns, 
unemployment and slow growth. In summary, Piore and Sabel (1984) link the 
growing needs for specialised and customised products to the need for the adoption of 
more flexible production practices, highlighting industrial districts as a vital carrier of 
this flexibility.  
Other researchers attempt to give an explanation of clusters emphasising knowledge 
and learning that takes place within clusters. Malberg and Maskell (1997), among 
others, suggest that clusters emerge as a response to increasing demand for rapid 
knowledge transfer between firms. Maskell and Lorenzen (2004) and Tallman et al 
(2004) argue that clusters are suitable for the creation, transfer and usage of 
knowledge. Rosenfeld (1997) emphasises a cluster’s dynamic intangible 
characteristics, i.e. flows of information, knowledge and innovation, as well as the 
importance of its social capital in enabling it to remain competitive through 
adaptation and diversification. Porter (1998a) argues that (local) clusters provide 
unique knowledge, relationships and motivation in a globalised economy, and many 
more features that boost productivity and enhance competitiveness. 
One of the basic themes running through the above literature has been that industrial 
districts seem to both contain and generate industrial dynamism that industrial 
districts are suggested as alternative ways to sustained growth (see among others, 
Sengenberger, Loveman and Piore, 1990; Best, 1990; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992). 
Further, as many types of industrial districts appear to be viable examples of 
development hubs in less developed countries as well, the benefits of creating or 
maintaining industrial districts is thus emphasised as a major objective of industrial 
policy (Schmitz 1984; 1990; Schmitz and Musyck 1994).
‡‡‡ As a result, policies for 
the promotion of industrial districts have been proposed, both for developing 
countries and other less favoured regions (Brusco 1989). An interesting issue is now 
in which ways the state can, through its policies or actions, support the creation or 
enhancement of SMEs and clusters.  
Brusco and Righi (1989) highlight the role of local government, industrial policy and 
social consensus for the development of industrial districts. An array of possible roles 
and actions of the public sector are highlighted. A non-exhaustive list includes 
vocational training, the provision of real services, and business counselling, (e.g. 
 
††† These institutions were functioning as an industrial policy, see Best (1990: 38). For the case of 
Springfield Armory as an inadvertent industrial policy, and also Best and Forrant (1996). 
‡‡‡ See also Parrilli, discussing the potential of so-called ‘survival clusters’ in less developed countries, 
in Chapter XX of this volume.   7
Brusco 1992, Brusco and Bigarelli 1997); consent and constructive partnership of 
state and private sector at local and national level (e.g. Hirst and Zeitlin 1989); the 
promotion of trust and inter-firm relations (e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). 
Best (1990) is a considerable contribution, setting this flourishing literature in the 
context of an emerging  type of competition which calls for appropriate industrial 
policies.  
He defines “new competition” as a novel form of competition, based on, and linked 
to, market-shaping activities as opposed to market-reacting responses. He suggests 
that the “new competition” can be distinguished from the “old competition” along 
four dimensions (Best 1990: 11). 
•  The organisation of the firm. The firm in “new competition” is a collective 
entrepreneur more like Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial firm than the 
hierarchically structured firm of Chandler and Williamson. Such a firm is 
characterised by a strategic orientation, Schumpeterian innovation (i.e. 
innovation in process, products or organisation), organisational flexibility, the 
promotion and use of collective knowledge, a more flexible organisation of 
production, an organisational culture of learning and thinking, and the 
incorporation of learning from doing into improved ways of doing. 
•  The co-ordination across the production chain (“consultative co-ordination”). 
The “new competition” could be best explained and described as an 
environment of consultative co-ordination between firms along the production 
chain. The firms are mutually interdependent in that, sharing problem-solving 
at a time of rapid technological change gives a competitive lead to all firms in 
the chain. Further, each of the firms, by specialising in a distinct phase of the 
same production chain, adds to the problem-solving potential of the whole 
system. However, this consultative (non-market) co-ordination does not rule 
out competition. Rather, competition is alive and encouraged between firms 
but by virtue of a long-term relationship of mutual trust and responsibility, 
which is ensured by specific social arrangements and norms. 
•  The “Sector”: Competition and Co-operation. “New competition” gives a 
different meaning to the industrial sector as well. The sector does not consist 
of identical firms producing homogeneous products and competing on price, 
as in neoclassical economics. Rather, the sector is compiled by a variety of 
interdependent firms (each one specialising in a distinct phase of the 
production chain) and inter-firm practices. Further, the sector comprises extra-
firm agencies (such as trade associations, training programmes, joint facilities 
for R&D and marketing, etc.) and regulatory bodies, all of which aim at 
promoting and facilitating inter-firm co-operation. Seen in this light, firms in a 
sector not only compete, but they can also collectively act to shape “the rules 
of the game” for all the firms, i.e. shape a sector strategy. The challenge is in 
establishing “means of co-operation that generate common benefits to the 
firms involved and the local economy, without the stifling effects presupposed 
by the conventional view” (1990: 18).  
•  The government and strategic industrial policy. Finally, indispensable for the 
“new competition” is the task of industrial (including antitrust) policy. Given 
the co-operative and competitive nature of firms’ relationships under “new 
competition”, industrial policy has to administer a paradox. That is, to   8
                                                
promote (a) the (adequate) mix of co-operation and competition conducive to 
long-term infrastructural development of a sector, and (b) the ability of the 
firms for constant innovation and responsiveness to new challenges and 
opportunities (1990: 19).  
Drawing on Japan’s and Italy’s industrial policies, Best (1990: 20) suggests that a 
successful industrial policy should 
i)  use creatively and shape the market; 
ii)  have a production as opposed to distributional focus; and  
iii) be strategically focused; i.e. target strategic sectors to maximise industrial growth. 
A similar view is Humphrey and Schmitz’s (1996) “triple-c approach” to industrial 
policy. In other words, (industrial) policies aiming at the promotion of industrial 
structures (mainly of SMES) capable to compete in a “new competition” environment, 
should aim at the following: First, they should target collective benefits, that is, public 
resources should become available to clusters, not individual firms.
§§§ Second, they 
should help firms and clusters to become more customer-oriented. Third, policies 
should aim at cumulative improvements in competitiveness (which may be stronger if 
the other two factors are already there). This suggests that policies should be carefully 
designed, long-term, consistent and coherent, and also that strength should be built on 
existing strength.  
To conclude, Marshall has arguably provided a framework to understand and analyse 
clusters (including industrial districts). Many authors have investigated the 
phenomenon of clusters, paying particular emphasis to one or the other feature of the 
Marshallian industrial district, e.g. Brusco (1990). Humphrey and Schmitz (1995) 
acknowledge that the gains from clustering, especially due to external economies and 
joint action are already there in Marshall. Sabel and Zeitlin (1985) share with 
Marshall the role and importance of “industrial atmosphere”. Becattini (1979) 
provides a detailed account of Marshall’s ideas on the issue of industrial districts. 
Lacking from such a wealthy literature, however, is a conceptual framework for 
clusters. Lawson’s (1999) competence theory of the region is the most integrated 
attempt to bring together insights from various camps (e.g. Marshallian industrial 
districts literature; economic geography; competence-based perspective). As firms are 
defined as bundles of competences in the competence-based theory, social systems 
can also be defined and analysed as bundles of competences. Lawson attributed 
special emphasis to linkages within smaller units of the cluster (e.g. firms, or public 
agencies, etc.) and interaction taking place within a cluster. He argues that our 
understanding of clusters and regions, and their dynamics, can greatly benefit from 
resource-based insights.  
We agree with that. On the other hand, however, the resource-based perspective does 
not seem to explain “why clusters, as a form of co-operation emerges” in the first 
place.
**** Richardson (1972) is the only one who provided a resource-based 
 
§§§ See also Bellandi in this volume for an analysis of the relationship between clusters and public 
goods. 
**** As noted above, we may also trace an explanation for co-operation in the transaction costs 
perspective, namely in the “promise” contracting process. This perspective, though, takes the 
transaction as the unit of analysis. But the nature of transactions may change with the change in the   9
                                                                                                                                           
explanation for co-operation, although he did not elaborate on the benefits of, or the 
conditions for it. In his 1972 work Richardson focused on static efficiency, explaining 
under which circumstances co-operation within firms is the more efficient way to 
organise production. He then extended his argument (Richardson (2001, 2003) by 
explaining how the degree of intra firm specialisation within the economy reduces the 
costs of adjustment to change. In a way, an economy with small firms is more 
flexible, thus more efficient in re-allocating resources following a change. In either 
case, co-operation is viewed as an alternative to market or intra-firm co-ordination. 
Drawing on Richardson’s ideas on co-operation and extending the Penrosean theory 
of the growth of the firm to (the growth of) clusters, we attempt to move from the 
(Penrosean) firm to the Richardsonian co-operation of (Penrosean) firms in the 
following section.  
III  Towards a Richardsonian and Penrosean conceptual framework for (the 
growth of) clusters 
Penrose (1959)examines the growth (expansion) of the firm. Expansion depends on 
the perceived productive opportunity of the firm. The latter is defined with reference 
to “all of the productive possibilities that its entrepreneurs see and can (and are 
willing) to take advantage of” (1959: 31). The latter, in turn, depend on the 
managerial services that are available to the firm.  
One of the basic determinants of the quantity and quality of entrepreneurial and 
managerial services available to the firm is knowledge. Knowledge is generated 
inside the firm and is used by the firm either for carrying out given activities or for 
planning and executing expansion, see e.g. Pseiridis (2001). This knowledge is thus 
essential both in shaping the “productive opportunity” of the firm and (subsequently) 
planning and implementing its expansion.  
At this point we need to examine in more depth the Penrosean notion of knowledge: 
its generation and its carriers (people working inside a firm). We also need to examine 
in more detail the Penrosean firm’s “productive opportunity” and its inducements to 
grow. In so doing, we will attempt to show the following. First, that clusters of firms 
may be seen as an expanded (or quasi) Penrosean firm. Second, and drawing on the 
previous point, that in cases of activities requiring co-operation à la Richardson, there 
can be Penrose-type effects within co-operating firms which might be working 
simultaneously and complementarily with Penrose-type effects within single firms. 
Third, while Richardson’s ideas contribute towards our understanding of the 
circumstances under which co-operation will be the most efficient option, Penrose’s 
ideas are needed to identify how and why the entrepreneurs are able to understand 
when the nature of some activities necessitates intra-firm co-operation.  
Richardson (1972, 2003) has pointed to co-operation as a third mode of carrying out 
economic activities – the other two being the “market” and consolidation (hierarchy). 
He provided a rationale for firm co-operation based on the nature of the economic 
activities that have to be carried out and on the nature of the distinct capabilities by 
economic agents. He defined ”similar activities” as those requiring the same 
 
perceptions or actions of entrepreneurs who see co-operation (i.e. the co-ordination of dissimilar but 
complementary activities) as a profitable productive opportunity. Hence this perspective with its 
instability trap cannot be of much help towards understanding (the choice/emergence of) clusters.   10
capabilities, while “complementary activities” as those that need to be combined with 
complementary ones for the production of a specific product. Richardson suggests 
that when two firms possess dissimilar capabilities that need to be ”closely” matched 
for the production of a given product, then these firms would find co-operation to be 
their best option (the alternatives being either market co-ordination or intra-firm co-
ordination). This given product would be produced more efficiently if co-ordination 
took place within a co-operative arrangement than if each firm independently 
produced their part of the product and used the market to do the co-ordination. That 
is, to let co-ordination take place through the market would probably entail problems 
with specifications, quality etc.. If one of the two firms decided to carry out the whole 
of production itself, this would require too much effort for the acquisition of the 
necessary matching capability. Thus co-operation is best in the case of 
complementary activities requiring dissimilar capabilities. That is, intra-firm co-
operation is the most efficient way to organise production when it is important that 
activities be “closely” co-ordinated, while the capabilities needed for each activity are 
different.  
Accordingly, integration is best when activities are both similar and complementary. 
Markets are best when activities are in no need of close co-ordination. This includes 
both cases of similar and dissimilar activities. Both cases are very interesting, because 
they it is difficult to predict what the most efficient arrangement would be.  
Let us start with the case of similar and non-complementary activities. When two 
activities require the same capability but no close co-ordination along a single 
production chain (similar but non-complementary activities) this could probably be 
reason for all three types of economic organization. The “market” co-ordination is the 
most obvious outcome. Each firm would specialize in its activity while another firm 
having the same capability would specialize in another activity, both leaving the co-
ordination of the production of their respective given products to the market. But, 
both firms could seek other activities (carried out by other firms) which could be 
combined for the production of a third or fourth product. Here each firm can be seen 
to belong to a different co-ordination chain, and co-ordination may take place either 
in the market, or through co-operation. There is also a case that these firms will find a 
way to exploit more fully their respective similar capability by increasing their scale 
(“firm”) or by conceiving and introducing a combination of their capability with 
complementary ones. If the latter are owned by other firms, co-operation will ensue. If 
the latter are owned by the same firm, there will be intra-firm co-ordination. If the 
complementary activities do not necessitate “close” co-ordination, co-ordination will 
be left to the market.   
The above hold if we consider that capabilities and activities remain constant through 
time and that two firms may possess almost identical capabilities. If we relax these, 
then there is the potential for specialization of capabilities, so that the activities are no 
longer “similar”.  
This potential for specialisation of capabilities could eventually alter the nature of the 
activities themselves. The initial similar capabilities owned by two firms, could be 
replaced by dissimilar ones (let’s say capability A, variant 1 owned by the one firm 
and capability A, variant 2 by the other firm). These dissimilar activities could then 
point to “market”, if they are in no need for co-ordination for the production of a 
specific product. Further, at a later stage (and according to each firm’s productive 
opportunity) there is also the possibility of either of these two specialised   11
activities/capabilities to be used, along with other, different ones, possessed by other 
firms, in the production of other products (“co-operation”). Finally there is the 
possibility that either firm could use its own capability variant to produce other 
complementary variants (i.e. “similar capabilities”) which could then be internally 
combined for the autonomous production of new products. Similar reasoning could 
apply to the case of dissimilar and non-complementary activities.   
To summarise, it is more efficient for activities which do not need close co-ordination 
to be left to the “market”. That is, it is inefficient for a single firm to carry out 
(diversify into) unrelated activities which demand the use of different capabilities. In 
the case of unrelated activities which rely on a single capability, then a firm has a 
stimulus for diversification into different activities. Crafting the Penrosean rationale 
for firm growth into the above stories would provide the following account: similar 
and non-complementary activities could be seen as an inducement for a firm to 
explore further its existing capability into new product lines or markets, which hints 
to expansion into “neighbouring” areas.
††††Further, dis-similar and non-
complementary activities could lead, if specialization of capabilities takes place 
through time, to the same kinds of inducement for internal growth or co-operation. 
Table 1 summarises the above. 
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 Table 1. Richardson: markets, consolidation, and co-operation 
 
Therefore, we have a production-based explanation of co-operation. That is, co-
operation occurs, according to Richardson, because in some cases it is the most 
efficient of the three modes available. Thus, just as “co-operation” between people 
within a firm (and related specialisation and division of labour) results in increased 
productivity, co-operation between firms, bringing with it a combination of 
                                                 
††††  Penrose defines as “neighbouring areas” those that have two of the following three elements in 
common with the previous activity of the firm: these elements are: market, technology, and product.   12
specialisation and division of labour properties, may result in increased productivity 
(through its positive effects on human resources, infrastructure, knowledge, etc.) in 
the economy. 
Richardson’s ideas are useful in providing us with an explanation of observed forms 
and/or predict co-operation between firms. For example, one can observe a joint 
research agreement between two firms and explain it in Richardsonian terms. One 
might say that the activities that have been “jointly” undertaken must have required 
the combination of distinct capabilities (and each firm within the agreement should, 
by definition, have at least one unique capability, hence the activities must be 
“dissimilar”). In saying so here we ignore the possibility that two activities, no matter 
how complementary and/or similar they are) do not merge into one activity once some 
form of co-operation has been introduced. This might tend to ignore that, post co-
operation, the initial activities may be transformed, altered, or fused with each other 
to a degree that it might be difficult to describe, ex post, the initial activities. Further, 
that the firms that engaged in some form of co-operation must have done so because 
both activities are, in some way, crucially linked (“complementary” activities).  
It is interesting to note here that many firms are seen to “internalise” dissimilar 
activities, either complementary (as is the case with vertical integration), or even non-
complementary (as is the case with diversification). Why do they do so? Maybe they 
do so because the benefits from consolidation exceed the costs of carrying out and co-
ordinating dissimilar activities. For example, a large firm may acquire more power in 
the market (thus enjoy monopoly profit) by undertaking dissimilar activities on its 
own. Were it to leave these to the market (and/or other firms), other firms might take 
better advantage of them and, at one time or another, they would probably 
“internalise” (take over) the firm themselves.  
In the case that activities are similar and complementary, that can be so either because 
the output of one activity is used as a specialised input for the output of the other 
activity, or because both activities provide outputs which have to be used in parallel 
to produce a given output. The first point has been extensively explained in 
Richardson (1972, 2003). The second, however, has remained rather vague. If the 
output of two activities has to be used in parallel, this implies the existence of a third, 
distinct activity of combining the two. The capability of combination hints to the 
existence of “excess” managerial services that will be used to implement any type of 
expansion (co-operation included), see below.  
The above shows that Richardson provides a good explanation for firm co-operation, 
focussing on the efficiency attributes of different types of organisation of production 
within an economy. This explanation is useful in that it departs from the view of co-
operation of (neoclassical) firms as collusion and highlights positive benefits (at the 
production side), which include but also extend beyond the avoidance of the negatives 
(such as transaction costs), see also Pseiridis (2001). Further, it is also useful in that it 
helps understand various observed types of inter-firm co-operation, pointing to a base 
for a conceptual framework for clusters of firms. However, while Richardson may be 
useful in explaining why clusters or any other form of firm co-operation have ensued, 
there are still many issues to be addressed . For example, is it obvious to any firm that 
some activities require some form of co-operation? Penrose’s ideas are useful in 
filling these gaps, as will be explained below.   13
At this point, it is helpful to be reminded of the Penrosean “productive opportunity”. 
As Penrose writes, 
“The productive activities of such a firm are governed by what we shall call its 
“productive opportunity”, which comprises all of the productive possibilities 
that its “entrepreneurs” see and can take advantage of. … It is clear that this 
opportunity will be restricted to the extent to which a firm does not see 
opportunities for expansion, is unwilling to act upon them, or is unable to 
respond to them.” (1959: 31-32, emphasis added).  
Most probably, the ability of a firm to choose a Richardsonian mode of co-ordination 
(co-operation, consolidation or market) must be already there in the productive 
opportunity of the firm. Its entrepreneurs may choose just because they are able to see 
and to make an economic judgement about alternative options. Therefore, the action 
of choosing and instituting a type of intra-firm, inter-firm or market co-ordination 
does not seem to be one which may be left to be done by random forces. Whether a 
firm’s choice will be successful is another matter, pertaining to some kind of 
“planning”, “decision”, “managing expansion” or “executing” capability that a firm 
may possess (or, perceives that it possesses); the issue here is that a firm purposefully 
chooses between several options (including to leave co-ordination of activities to the 
market) that it is able to discern. 
Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that observed modes of co-ordination 
might not (prove to) be the best choice for a firm. As much as we are able to say that 
the jointly run research programme mentioned above might be a successful 
combination of unique, dissimilar skills needed for complementary activities, we 
could equally find out that such a co-ordination mode may have proved unsuccessful. 
This may be due to inadequate judgement of entrepreneurs, both regarding the 
existence of co-operation as a profitable productive opportunity (presupposing a good 
perception of internal capabilities of the firm, see below) and regarding the excess 
managerial resources available to effect (expansion in the form of) co-operation. On 
the other hand, firms that enter into co-operative arrangements that are consistently 
successfully and prove profitable to the participants signals that both firms have made 
a purposeful and educated choice than of their luck.  
But, what does a purposeful and educated choice consist of?Each firm is guided, in its 
operations and activities, by the need to fulfil an objective. To delve into the 
determinants of specific objectives is not attempted here; we just find it plausible to 
adopt Penrose’s assumption that  
“financial and investment decisions of firms are controlled by a desire to 
increase total long-run profits. Total profits will increase with every increment 
of investment that yields a positive return, regardless of what happens to the 
marginal rate (original emphasis) of return on investment, and firms will want 
to expand as fast as they can take advantage of opportunities for expansion that 
they consider profitable. … In other words, profits would be desired for the 
sake of the firm itself and in order to make more profit through expansion.” 
(1959: 29, emphasis added) 
Therefore, the Penrosean firm purposefully adopts either a type of Richardsonian co-
ordination or no “co-ordination” at all (i.e. the market). There emerges a most 
interesting issue now. How is a firm’s productive opportunity shaped? Do the 
entrepreneurs see all of the productive possibilities that are open to them? Further,   14
what does their judgement about productive possibilities and their implementation 
possibilities depend upon?  
To address this, we follow Penrose and assume that the relationship between the firm 
and its productive opportunity is a dynamic one. The availability and quality of 
entrepreneurial services shape, to a great extent, the productive possibilities available. 
Therefore, if a firm is seen to choose between the three Richardsonian modes of co-
ordination, it chooses one to the other because its entrepreneurs are, first, able to see 
this mode as an opportunity; they then judge it as potentially more profitable vis-à-vis 
the other ones which they see as available.  
This is how Penrose puts it:  
“[A]lthough the ‘objective’ productive opportunity of a firm is limited by what 
the firm is able to accomplish, the ‘subjective’ productive opportunity is a 
question of what it thinks it can accomplish. … ‘Expectations’ and not 
‘objective facts’ – indeed there must be if action is to be successful, for the 
success of a firm’s plans depends only partly on the execution of them and 
partly on whether they are based on sound judgment about the possibilities for 
successful action. In the last analysis the ‘environment’ rejects or confirms the 
soundness of the judgments about it, but the relevant environment is not an 
objective fact discoverable before the event. … Firms do not only alter the 
environmental conditions necessary for the success of their actions, but, even 
more important, they know that they can alter them and that the environment is 
not independent of their own activities. … We shall be interested in the 
environment as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind, for we want, among 
other things, to discover what economic considerations, as contrasted with 
‘temperamental’ considerations, determine entrepreneurial judgments about the 
environment.” (1959: 41-42) 
A choice by the entrepreneurs, and implementation, of a Richardsonian co-ordination 
mode (e.g. inter-firm co-operation) may prove to be successful or disastrous to the 
firm. What determines the possibilities for success, both in the choice of mode and 
further implementation of the chosen mode? To address this issue, we should go back 
to the inner workings of the Penrosean firm. 
According to Penrose, a firm’s resources (human and physical) render services to the 
firm. Just as each firm consists of a bundle of resources, each resource consists of a 
bundle of potential services. The services that any given resource, in its interaction 
with other firm resources, gives to the firm are firm dependent. That is, the same 
resource will not yield the same services to a firm as it would if it was employed in 
another firm. Each firm’s uniqueness lies exactly in the fact that resources can be 
defined independently of their use, while services cannot. 
Apart from physical products or services to be sold, one important output of the 
everyday workings of the firm is the creation of “excess” productive services within 
the firm, and knowledge. The former is an input in the expansion process and the 
latter is an input into all productive resources and, consequently, the firm’s productive 
opportunity. Further, the expansion process creates more, and more specialised, 
services (especially managerial ones) which are freed once the expansion process is 
finished.    15
Hence, more and more unused productive services are becoming available to a firm, 
either through the everyday working or after an expansion process: productive 
services of a similar type as the existing ones, freed because existing resources are not 
entirely exploited, while they get more and more efficient with given tasks; and also 
new productive services, generated through the expansion process and freed once 
expansion has taken place. In parallel, unused productive services are further 
increased and improved owing to experience and knowledge acquired by human 
resources working in a firm. That is, the potential of existing resources to yield 
services (of any type) increases while these resources gain experience.  
It is in this process of acquiring knowledge through experience that a firm’s capability 
to actually see a Richardsonian mode of co-ordination, judge it as profitable and take 
action to adopt it may lie. Further, once (expansion through) co-operation has taken 
place, human resources from both firms end up with a stock of similar and/or “new” 
productive services (importantly, some of them unique to the co-operative entity) to 
be redeployed in further expansion (in much the same way as a single firm is left with 
some new and unique productive services, after expansion has taken place). The 
direction of expansion will be dependent upon the existence of new profitable 
productive opportunities, either in individual productive opportunities or in the 
productive opportunity owned by the co-operative “entity”. 
In Penrose’s words,  
“[T]he experience gained is not only of the kind just discussed which enables a 
collection of individuals to become a working unit, but also of a kind which 
develops an increasing knowledge of the possibilities for action and the ways in 
which action can be taken by the group itself, that is, by the firm. This increase 
in knowledge not only causes the productive opportunity of a firm to change in 
ways unrelated to changes in the environment, but also contributes to the 
‘uniqueness’ of the opportunity of each individual firm” (1959: 52-53, emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, on the one hand, the services yielded by any one resource cannot be taken 
to exhaust total resource potential. On the other hand, experience endows individuals 
with even more increased potential.  
“[E]xperience produces increased knowledge about things … experience itself 
can never be transmitted; it produces a change – frequently a subtle change – in 
individuals and cannot be separated from them. Increasing experience shows 
itself in two ways – changes in knowledge and changes in the ability to use 
knowledge. There is no sharp distinction between these two forms because to a 
considerable extend the ability to use old knowledge is dependent on the 
acquisition of new knowledge.” (1959: 53, emphasis added) 
Further,  
“[O]nce it is recognised that the very process of operation and of expansion are 
intimately associated with a process by which knowledge is increased, then it 
becomes immediately clear that the productive opportunity of a firm will change 
even in the absence of any change in external circumstances or in fundamental 
technological knowledge.” (Penrose 1959: 56).  
That is, the Penrosean firm, having accumulated knowledge over time, through its 
everyday workings (for normal operation or expansion), is able to identify productive   16
                                                
possibilities that may not have existed for the firm before. Based on the same 
knowledge, the Penrosean firm is further able to assess whether these productive 
possibilities would be profitable. It is also able to draw a plan towards embracing this 
perceivably profitable productive possibility, as well as use its resources (and also 
acquire and absorb new resources) to implement this plan. 
Along similar lines, it could be argued that a co-operative arrangement provides 
conditions for interaction and “working together”, and thus acquiring experience, 
increasing knowledge, and producing “excess” services as is the case within a 
Penrosean firm. Individuals from both firms may be seen as individuals working 
within one firm; with the latter exhibiting somewhat lower levels of “administrative 
co-ordination and authoritative communication” (which for Penrose define the 
boundaries of the firm). Thus, to the extent that sufficient interaction within people of 
the two co-operating entities exists, it is reasonable to expect that a joint productive 
opportunity will be formed in the minds of the entrepreneurs, one which will include 
(joint) knowledge generated from joint activities, and excess services generated from 
working together that will be unique to the co-operative entity. Importantly, such 
knowledge and excess services would be valuable features of the joint productive 
opportunity, in that they will point to further co-operation and further combinations of 
the excess resources of participating firms.
 ‡‡‡‡  
What emerges from the above is a Penrosean rationale and explanation for 
Richardsonian co-operation (and clusters of firms). Before the realisation of co-
operation with other firms, firms should be able to see in (a type of) co-operation a 
profitable productive possibility. Firms choose a type of co-operation to other 
Richardsonian forms of co-ordination, and they choose the most profitable type of co-
operation, judging on two grounds: the future increases in the productive opportunity 
they face, and the means they own (free services) to carry out expansion. If co-
operation proves “successful” and profitable over a long time, one can reasonably 
assume that the judgement of the firms involved has been quite accurate, and also that 
these firms had had the ability, apart from identifying a profitable productive 
possibility in co-operation, to plan and execute its implementation. 
To conclude, Penrosean firms, through the process of acquiring experience (and 
through this, knowledge) within their operation and expansion, gain and thus possess 
the necessary capabilities to identify, plan and execute expansion in any form (e.g. 
through acquisition of resources, co-operation etc.). One such form may be some type 
of Richardsonian inter-firm co-operation, for example alliances, joint ventures, 
clusters, etc.. In some cases, participating firms hold their separate identity by 
 
‡‡‡‡ In this light, co-operation can be seen to be superior to integration in terms of potential strategies 
(“productive opportunities”) available to the members of the cluster. Namely, a cluster, due to its large 
number of “participants”, offers more opportunities for promptly re-organising production and re-
dividing labour within it in the presence of environmental changes (see also Andriani, 2001). Co-
operation (à la Richardson) between two firms by definition does not offer the opportunity to re-
organise production (since co-operation ensues when the two firms possess different capabilities 
needed simultaneously for the production of a specific product). What is crucial is the number of firms 
and potential linkages that are there in a specific cluster. Along similar lines, another argument would 
be that firms involved in clusters may have enhanced prospects of increasing their knowledge base 
(hence their respective productive opportunities) compared to “single-value-chain” integrated firms, 
due to the possibility of interaction with firms working in the same and other value chains (see Collins 
et al., 2002).   17
                                                
maintaining sufficient administrative co-ordination within them, as is the case with 
formal or informal contractual agreements. In other cases the boundaries of 
participating firms might get a little intertwined, as is the case with deliverable-
oriented alliances or some kinds of clustering. In other cases still, a separate entity 
that may be identified as a firm may come as a result, see below.  
It is reasonable to suggest that in all cases, albeit to a greater degree when boundaries 
of participating firms get somewhat fused, (individuals in) participating firms, through 
their everyday workings and interaction, acquire experience, in almost the same way 
that human resources within a firm acquire experience by working together. In other 
words, people working together within a firm gain experience, and, through 
experience they gain knowledge, which affects their service yielding potential and the 
firm’s productive opportunity. In much the same way, firms working together, by 
virtue of their human resources working together within some type of inter-firm co-
operation, also gain knowledge through experience which affects, apart from the 
separate firms’ productive opportunities, a joint productive opportunity. That is, a 
joint venture, cluster, or other form of inter-firm co-operation might possess a unique 
productive opportunity of its own which would not exist had the participating firms 
not entered into co-operation. Importantly, this productive opportunity cannot be 
exploited (at least in the short run) by individual firms alone. 
It is in this joint productive opportunity that profitable productive possibilities might 
be jointly available to participating firms. But, this productive opportunity will be 
there, and will be continuously augmented, only to the degree that sufficient 
communication exists between (resources of) participating firms. The existence of 
profitable productive possibilities within this joint productive opportunity might be a 
reason why co-operating firms are seen to continue co-operating, e.g. be embarking 
on new co-operative ventures. The lack of profitable productive possibilities in firms’ 
respective productive opportunities might be the reason for not initiating co-operation 
in the first place. Once co-operation has been instituted and working, a lack of joint 
profitable productive opportunities might signal that individual firms have not 
allowed sufficient communication either between them and other firms, or within 
themselves, or that individual productive opportunities present more valuable options 
than the joint one (it could also be bad perception of the productive opportunities 
available).
§§§§ In any event, it seems reasonable to assume that the Penrosean limit to 
the rate of growth applies both to individual firms and to their joint co-operation 
activity (to the extent that sufficient interaction exists between the resources of 
participating firms). The crucial issue here is that co-operating firms, apart from being 
able to benefit from a joint productive opportunity, might also be able to enjoy in 
parallel an expanded individual productive opportunity, due to interaction of their 
resources with those of other firms. The latter constitutes an opportunity that would 
not have been available in the first place, that is, had they not seen a profitable 
productive possibility in co-operation and had they not entered into it. 
To summarise, in this section we highlighted the interest that firm co-operation, 
including clusters, has received in the literature and policy from the 80s onwards. 
 
§§§§ Similarly, co-operation might not always be the best choice of (Richardsonian) mode. A fuller 
investigation into the division of labour between market, consolidation and co-operation (and their 
respective productivity benefits) is an exciting research topic to be pursued. Here we only focus on the 
productivity benefits of co-operation explicable in terms of Richardsonian and Penrosean insights.   18
                                                
However, there is still scope for a conceptual framework for clusters and their growth. 
We attempted to address this by suggesting a conceptual framework for clusters, 
building on Richardson’s insights on co-operation and Penrosean insights on 
knowledge and firm growth. We suggest that Penrosean effects of knowledge and 
experience may apply to co-operating firms and clusters as well. Interestingly, co-
operation (and clusters) may create a joint productive opportunity that would not be 
there if firms did not choose co-operation (clustering). At the same time, co-operation 
may enhance individual firms’ productive opportunities, thus enhancing the whole 
economy’s productive opportunity. A prerequisite for the exploitation of these 
productive opportunities is the existence of sufficient and efficient (entrepreneurial 
and managerial) services within firms. The existence of such services is important in 
seeing co-operation as a profitable opportunity, and successfully acting towards it. 
Following from the above, there are three points worth highlighting towards a 
conceptual framework for co-operation and clusters. First, co-operative arrangements 
(including clusters) of firms may be seen as an expanded (or quasi) Penrosean firm. 
Second, drawing on the previous point, in the cases of activities requiring co-
operation à la Richardson, there can be Penrose-type effects within co-operating firms 
which might be working simultaneously and complementarily with Penrose-type 
effects within single firms, all of them leading to increases in productivity. Third, 
while Richardson’s ideas contribute towards our understanding of the circumstances 
under which co-operation will ensue, Penrose’s ideas are needed to identify how and 
why the entrepreneurs are able to understand when (and when not) the nature of some 
activities necessitates intra-firm co-operation. Having discussed “when co-operation” 
and “how this choice comes about and works”, in the following section we will 
attempt to discuss the issue of “why support co-operation and clusters?”, by linking 
our discussion to recent concerns about productivity and competitiveness.  
IV  Clusters and the determinants of productivity 
Having examined the advantages stemming from co-operation, we pursue further the 
effects of co-operation and clusters on firm (but also regional and national) 
productivity and competitiveness. To do this, we expand on the “productivity-
competitiveness wheel” model (Pitelis 1998). In this model, competitiveness is linked 
with productivity, which is shaped by four elements: human resources; infrastructure; 
unit cost economies; technology and innovativeness. All these work within the 
broader sectoral, regional, macro-economic, and social and institutional environment. 
Horizontal measures, optimal firm size, clusters of SMEs, and firm strategies for 
sectoral restructuring are all linked to the “competitiveness wheel”, through their 
effects on the determinants of productivity. But, how exactly do clusters affect the 
productivity wheel? We will attempt to throw some light to this issue, based on our 
previous analysis. 
1. Human resources. Human resources within a cluster, by virtue of the continuous 
interaction that takes place, are more likely to specialise in the cluster’s needs.
***** 
Human resources within a Penrosean firm expand their potential services by working 
together within a firm; human resources within a cluster may enrich further this 
 
***** On this point see also, among others, Reuber and Fischer (2001).  See also the chapter by 
Quintana and Pulignano in this volume for a discussion of the interface between industrial relations 
and clustering processes.    19
                                                
potential by having the opportunity to work together with other people within their 
cluster. Hence, a cluster expands and enriches the opportunities for fruitful interaction 
between human resources, which may increase their quality and availability (in the 
Penrosean sense of “excess” productive services). Since the quality and availability of 
human resources is a determinant of productivity, clusters offer opportunities for 
increased productivity through the enhanced (potential of) human resources.  
2. Infra-structure. 
A cluster may offer improved material resources to the firms located within it relative 
to those located outside. That is so because all the workings that take place within a 
cluster are more oriented to the cluster’s needs. Therefore, roads, telecommunication 
networks, computer networks, etc. are more fully used within a cluster (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 1995), and also their enhancement is oriented to serve the logic of the 
cluster’s needs.
††††† This also comprises infrastructure generated through common 
action by the cluster’s members.
‡‡‡‡‡ Machinery for common use, bought through 
understanding of mutual needs and common action and funding, is a case in point.  
Apart from this commonly mentioned type of infrastructure, there is another type of 
“hard” infrastructure that is available to a cluster’s participants and may enhance their 
productivity and competitiveness. Within a cluster, specialised hard infrastructure 
owned by a member of the cluster becomes, in some way, property of all the other 
firms within a cluster. That is, firms may make use of this type of infrastructure by 
embedding its output in their own production process, thereby indirectly making use 
of others’ infrastructure. Since a cluster strengthens the motive for innovation in the 
firms within it, and the allocation of labour within it becomes more and more 
intricate, it could be said that this type of infrastructure within the cluster, which 
becomes all the more intricate and specialised to (a firm’s thus the) the cluster’s 
needs, is available, in some way, for use by other firms within it as well. Further, the 
benefits of investment in training staff made by one firm may easily spread to other 
firms, through the mobility of workers. Although this is an indirect way for a firm to 
“own” and make use of infrastructure actually owned by other firms, it is arguably a 
most important feature of a cluster that increases the productivity potential of the 
firms within it. Hence, clusters, by improving infrastructure content and quality in two 
ways, may actually lead to improved productivity relative to geographically dispersed 
firms of comparable size. 
3. Unit cost economies.  
Clusters are usually associated with small firm size. The benefits from clustering may 
outweigh losses from the absence of large size and the benefits traditionally 
associated with large volumes of production (e.g. economies of scale or economies of 
learning, the latter associated with cumulative volume); see Marshall, 1920; Piore & 
Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990 among others. A cluster as a whole may or may not achieve 
economies of scale as such (i.e. in terms of volume of a single product), but it may 
replicate them. The likelihood of the existence of economies of learning (e.g. by an 
 
††††† See also Porter (1998a), who suggests that information generated within a cluster is more relevant 
to the cluster’s needs. 
‡‡‡‡‡ The common ownership of infrastructure, as well as the provision of “real services” by institutions 
within a cluster, is a common theme throughout the literature on clusters, see Pseiridis (2001) for a 
discussion.    20
                                                
increased cumulative volume of highly specialised parts), economies of experience, 
and also economies in transaction costs (facilitated by the the reduction in 
opportunism and the existence of trust), may be larger within a cluster’s firms than 
within a single big firm unrelated to a cluster. Firms within a cluster may be in a 
privileged position to “shop” for knowledge and other inputs in other, heavily 
specialised (small) firms.
§§§§§ Since specialisation and flexibility are more relevant 
to/associated with small size and changing demand conditions, the quality of inputs 
(intermediate products) within a cluster will tend to be better than outside. While, 
therefore, a large firm may reap high economies of scale or economies of learning for 
a given product, a cluster might have proceeded to produce the next generation of this 
product, thus establishing early positions in the markets and hence enjoying the 
benefits associated with first-mover advantages and the introduction of new 
technologies, products, processes, etc.. This might be especially true in sectors or 
products with high technological/knowledge content, but not only there. Almost all 
sectors or products can be seen as having a high-technological/knowledge content, see 
e.g. Porter (1998a). Further, the existence of positive external economies as analysed 
in traditional economic theory is by definition more likely to occur within a cluster 
than without it (see, for example, Marshall, 1920; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996). 
In addition, management of firms within clusters may have more, and cheaper, 
opportunities for fruitful, face-to-face, everyday interaction (overall, opportunities for 
increased experience by working together, as has been put by Penrose for people 
working within a firm). Managerial staff are, therefore, more likely to face an 
augmented productive opportunity, which, moreover, will tend to include more, and 
more profitable, opportunities for internalisation of transactions.  
The competence of managers and entrepreneurs within a cluster’s firms may lead to 
an augmented productive opportunity for each firm that may also include profitable 
opportunities for Richardsonian co-operation, as illustrated in the previous section. 
That is, competent management is more likely to demonstrate a higher degree of self-
knowledge. Knowing a firm’s capabilities (plus an appropriate degree of interaction) 
produces opportunities for profitable capability matches, that is, co-operation.
****** 
This may also be the missing link between transactions and choosing to carry out 
appropriate transactions for efficient production. Whether it will be most profitable to 
internalise these transactions (integration) or to carry them out via the “market” (co-
operation or Coasean “market”) depends on the nature of the transactions, i.e. on the 
complementarity and similarity of “Richardsonian activities”, as presented above. 
Further, there are instances within clusters where the costs of purchase and 
maintenance of machinery and infrastructure (e.g. common buildings, warehouses, 
exposition areas, etc.) are shared by many firms. As a result, the capacity of these 
resources might by used more fully and, consequently, at lower cost per unit produced 
than if they were owned by a single firm. 
 
§§§§§ Apart from this, co-operation of firms may produce some assets (such as ad-hoc services) which 
may be available to collocated firms, see Nicolini (2001). 
****** This is especially aided by the use of internet and communication technologies, which make 
interaction and communication less costly and, taken to the extreme, may induce the development of 
clusters with firms which are not really geographically close, i.e. the development of “virtual” clusters.   21
Last, but not least, close interaction of firms within a cluster can result in economies 
of time. That is, feedback on a firm’s products that are used as inputs for the other 
firm’s production process may be faster than where the firms were geographically 
dispersed. Face-to-face interaction in the locality may also enhance this effect. 
To summarise, collocation of firms within a geographical area may reduce unit costs 
in at least five ways. First, production costs may be lower owing to continuous 
innovations (and new technologies used) that may take place within a cluster. Second, 
and related, firms within a cluster may enjoy economies related to first mover 
advantages, i.e. introduction of new products. Third, transactions within a cluster may 
be fewer or less costly (as trust may be stronger), and internalisation of transactions is 
more likely to lead to real, tangible, transaction cost economies. Fourth, a cluster will 
benefit from external economies. For example, interaction may bring economies of 
learning, albeit not for a given product, but rather in processes, innovation etc., see 
also Richardson 2003 (for example, economies of learning to innovate, economies of 
learning to learn, economies of learning to change, etc.). Further, the cost of purchase 
and maintenance of shared machinery and infrastructure is more likely to be lower 
when these are (more fully) used by many firms within a cluster. Fifth, firms within a 
cluster may also realise reasonable time economies. 
The above suggest the existence of some beneficial effects of clustering on unit costs. 
It can thus be suggested that the collocation of small firms or a large size firm (that 
already enjoys advantages of size) within a cluster of mainly small firms could 
increase benefits for all firms in terms of unit cost economies.  
4. Technology and innovation. 
There is a large literature on innovation and incentives to innovate. Among this, there 
is growing recognition and evidence that (clusters of) small firms can be more 
innovative than large firms. There are a number of ways that clusters can have 
beneficial effects on technology and innovativeness, some of which are explored in 
detail in the chapters in this volume by Henry and Pinch and Di Tomasso et al.. 
First, collocation improves communication and interaction between firms with 
different skills and capabilities. Mutual interdependence leads to continuous efforts to 
improve (see Cowling and Sugden, 1999, on localities, and Porter, 1998a, on peer 
pressure). Firms within a cluster recognise their mutual interdependence and also 
strive for excellence to distinguish themselves from peers. Thus a problematic input 
may turn out to bring about a technological breakthrough as well as increased status 
within the local community. 
Second, to the extent collocation favours the division of tasks among firms, the 
everyday workings of firms are more oriented to the cluster’s (or to specific firms’) 
needs. That is, specialised skills increase and become available for use in new, but 
related, areas; along with increased skills, innovative ideas are more likely to abound.  
Third, geographical proximity of firms enhances favourable conditions for profitable 
Richardsonian co-operation and transaction internalisation. Co-operation of firms may 
by itself constitute an innovative idea regarding business practices; internalisation of 
transactions could be seen under the same light.  
Fourth, technology available to some firms within a cluster may be improved by 
common actions (and also at a smaller cost than were it purchased and maintained by 
one single firm). For example, many firms that have also shared relevant expenses   22
may share high technology tools or machinery, or specialised (e.g. CAD/CAM) 
computer applications.  
5. Sectoral, regional, and Institutional atmosphere. 
Clusters can be seen as a more participatory and open industrial structure, vis-à-vis 
large firms (see Cowling and Sugden, 1999). It is thus likely that clusters enjoy wider 
support from the communities within which they operate. Therefore, requests of firms 
within clusters regarding infrastructure, legislation, education programmes, publicly 
funded research, etc., may enjoy a wider base of support from local or state 
authorities, as they encapsulate needs from a wider base within the locality, and as 
benefits will be widely dispersed within it. In this context, working interaction 
between firms and the authorities is more likely to be fruitful at a local (cluster 
locality) level, than elsewhere. Further to this, and subsequently, peer pressure within 
a cluster may cross the boundaries of the cluster and “infect” public officers as well. It 
is thus most likely that, through working, everyday interaction, public officers will 
have increased motivation to serve the clusters’ and the locality’s needs.  
We attempted to address in detail the way clusters are linked to the “productivity-
competitiveness wheel” introduced by Pitelis (1998). In a similar vein, Porter’s (1998) 
“diamond” of national competitiveness links some important attributes of a state (or 
region) to the competitiveness of its industries. He also suggests that clusters are 
crucial to competitiveness in that they positively affect all attributes of the “diamond” 
(Porter, 1990). The relationship, however, between clusters and competitiveness is not 
straightforward. It should start, we believe, with a discussion of the effects of clusters 
on productivity. 
We therefore tried to show in which ways clusters are important in enhancing the 
productivity potential of a state of region. To do this, we were assisted by the 
theoretical framework of clusters suggested in the previous section. That is, clusters 
may be seen as a Penrosean quasi-firm and may thus own some characteristics 
inherent to Penrosean firms. In this framework, it is interesting to note that cluster 
dynamics may lead to the incorporation, within this quasi-firm, of public officers as 
well. That is, locality and clustering may strengthen inter-organisational interaction, 
teamwork, co-operation and associated benefits. This is linked, for example, both to 
the ‘community’ framework in which Sugden et al. root their analysis of cluster 
governance in Chapter XX, and to the detailed discussion of territorial governance 
provided by Gilly and Perrat in Chapter XX. 
V  Some comments on implementation 
In this section we aim to apply aspects of the framework developed thus far in a brief 
analysis of a specific “cluster” policy, where comparisons might be drawn, for 
example, with the analysis of cluster policy in the Basque region of Spain provided by 
Aranguren et al. in Chapter XX. We focus on a notable example of a policy to support 
clusters in Greece; the “Future of Greek Industry” project (henceforth FGIP), run 
from 1994 until 1997, see Pitelis et al. (1997). The FGIP used local, national and 
international expertise to produce a consensus-based industrial strategy for Greece. 
The organisation of the FGIP is illustrated in Figure 1. As a result, potential clusters 
were diagnosed, and among them “pilot” clusters were chosen, i.e. clusters that were 
considered to be good candidates for subsequent upgrading. Support would not accrue 
to individual participating firms, but to a distinct new legal entity (the “cluster   23
                                                
carrier”) which should be jointly owned by participating firms. To exploit market 
signals and dispersed knowledge on top of the results of the FGIP, funding was 
allocated through “open bids”, where firms in pilot but also in other clusters could 
apply. In what follows we provide some comments on implementation of the two first 
bids which led to the funding of 54 “cluster carriers”.
††††††
FIGURE 1 here 
Average number of firms in cluster carriers 
The average number of firms participating in each cluster carrier was 10 in the 1
st bid, 
and subsequently fell to 8 in the 2
nd bid.  
Both, are rather small numbers, not allowing for the existence of sufficient interaction 
between firms nor large scale projects.
‡‡‡‡‡‡ In the light of the preceding analysis, 
these small number of actively participating firms would not easily yield the 
advantages associated with interaction between the resources of various firms. 
Therefore, the individual productive opportunities and the joint one would not provide 
a full set of profitable productive opportunities to the firms involved.   
It is interesting to note that co-operation (in the form of the action towards creating a 
cluster carrier) has apparently been easier to establish when there were previous 
formal or informal linkages (acquaintances or pre-existing co-operation) with other 
firms/individuals.
§§§§§§ Importantly, many of these linkages had already been 
developed while potential clusters were being analysed within the FGIP. Many 
workgroup members were the first to motivate firms to co-operate and jointly apply 
for funding. This partly explains the fact that almost half of the supported clusters 
were empowered/organised by local people who were involved, one way or another, 
in carrying out the analyses of the potential clusters. Hence another “product” of the 
FGIT has been the development of knowledge regarding the potential benefits of co-
operation and clustering within the analysed areas, which was subsequently used to 
spur the development of clusters.  
Table 2 provides a list of the potential (some of them “pilot”) clusters that were 
identified by the FGIP, and the corresponding number of successful proposals for the 
creation of cluster carriers. These proposals, however, were not the only ones that 
were eventually funded. Funding was also allocated to proposals for cluster carriers 
that had not been identified by the FGIP.  
 
 
†††††† In what follows we were assisted by interviews with managing directors of clusters. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ It has to be noted that the (“formal”) cluster carriers referred to here are smaller than the 
(“informal”) cluster which comprises all the (informally) linked firms as well, see also footnote Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
§§§§§§ This might be explained with reference to the framework for analysing trust discussed by Dupuy 
and Torre in Chapter XX of this volume.   24
Table 2 · Potential and funded clusters 








Software applications and software 
for technical construction firms (*) 
Attica 0  0 
Laser applications in industry  Attica  -  - 





Juice producers (*)  all of Greece  -  - 
Industrial area of Elaionas (*)  Attica  -  - 
Perama shipbuilding and repair 
area and Piraeus Shipping Centre 
(*) 
Attica 0  1 
Metal products (*)  Kozani & 
Volos 
2 0 
Postgraduate studies and further 
training 
Attica 1  0 
Consultancy services  Attica  -  - 
Wine (*)  Macedonia & 
Epirus 
1 0 
Meat and dairy products (*)  Thrace & 
Epirus 
2 0 
Development of a biomass cluster 
(*) 
Thrace 0  0 
Garments Xanthi,  Drama 
& Kavala 
4 2 
Marble (*)  Macedonia & 
Epirus 
1 3 
Canned fruit (*)  Northern 
Greece 
0 2 
Wood and office furniture  Northern 
Greece 
1 1 
Quality products, primary 
manufacturing, tourist services (*) 
Crete 2  0 
Furs (*)  Kastoria  1  0 





Total     16  9 
Total funded (grand total = 54)   28  26 
Source: Pseiridis (2001) 
Activities of funded cluster carriers  
Supported cluster carriers have mainly built on/boosted already existing activities, 
especially in “traditional” sectors (clothing, agricultural products and foods, marble). 
There were few notable exceptions to this rule (such as the cluster carriers in   25
informatics) especially in combinations with “traditional” activities (such as 
publishing), which point to the potential existence of more high-value-added/high 
technological content opportunities for future clusterings. 
Geographical dispersion of supported clusters and inter-cluster linkages 
Map 1 shows the geographical dispersion of the supported cluster carriers. It is 
obvious that the two largest cities of Greece (Athens and Salonica) are heavily 
concentrated with firms that are involved in cluster carriers. The less developed 
regions have been “represented” with relatively few proposals. For example, Thrace 
in NE Greece is the home region of only two cluster carriers (dairy products and food 
packaging) and another firm participating in the cluster carrier for the production of 
CD-ROMS.  
While the dairy products (which interestingly received the largest funding among 
“traditional” activities) and the packaging cluster in Thrace can be seen as 
complementary, we believe that funding of a third one (production of energy from 
biomass, which is a by-product of dairy firms) would strengthen the local clusters by 
providing more productive possibilities to the firms and cluster carriers involved.  
Amount of funding 
We believe that more funds should have been allocated to each proposal. Investment 
in such clusters would also be facilitated if the private (firm) cost of investment were 
spread across a larger number of quite large firms. For example, despite potential 
benefits (including linkages with other clusters in the region) the biomass cluster has 
been hard to empower. One reason could be that it represented a new activity with 
large capital requirements and within a less developed area in which there was no 
relevant knowledge from existing activities (and, importantly, also little knowledge 
about co-operation). 
Further, there have been other cases where initial and fixed funding was very small 
for subsequent development of the clusters, with no provision for (re-negotiation of) 
further funding to cluster carriers. A case in point is the SolarNet cluster (boiler 
production). While the initial business plan was modest, the participating firms 
subsequently realised that if their cluster carrier were to be successful, they ought to 
go for a larger investment or nothing. They opted for the former and created one of 
the most state-of-the art factories in Europe, with exports since its testing phase.  
A related issue pertains to the selection and support of multiple cluster carriers of the 
same activity, such as food (ten cluster carriers), clothing (six), marble (four), and 
aluminium products (three). In spite of allocating funds to similar clusters, the 
Ministry could have supported more diverse (and more open) ones in core areas. 
These could subsequently have attracted more participants into a path of further 
development. Most importantly, and to save funds that could support larger clustering 
ventures, the Ministry could have based its selection on an additional criterion: the 
existence of linkages between different clusters. Successful examples of 
complementary clusters are the dairy foods (1
st bid) and food packaging (2
nd bid) 
cluster carriers in Thrace.    26
Bureaucracy 
Another shortcoming of the implementation process faced by all clusters has been the 
large bureaucratic burden imposed on them by the Ministry. First of all, participating 
firms had to found a separate legal entity (i.e. the “cluster carrier”) to actually receive 
the funding, and then the cluster carrier ought to submit a letter of guarantee to the 
Ministry. Obtaining letters of guarantee from banks, however, proved a challenge for 
the cluster carriers, since the former are usually reluctant to guarantee newly-borns. 
Dealing with it resulted to a loss of valuable time and resources.  
The creation of a new legal entity and also tedious progress reports complete 
supporting paperwork were set to ensure that individual firms would not use funding 
received to support their own interests, but they would actually use it to promote 
collective interests.  
Interestingly, however, there have been instances that participating firms complained 
that their products were not given a fair share of the (joint) effort (mainly joint 
promotion in exhibitions or joint sales efforts). Usually cluster carriers were staffed 
by people from participating firms,; hence staff’s actions were biased towards the 
benefit of their “mother” firm. Since generally these were people of high skill and it 
would be unfortunate if they were precluded from taking positions in the cluster 
carrier, we believe there is no safer way of dealing with this inherent inequality, other 
than allowing a larger number of participating firms in a cluster carrier, to increase 
intra-carrier competition.  
Horizontal & vertical linkages 
We believe that some of the most interesting developments that were brought about 
have been within clustering proposals that aimed to improve the (quality of) the 
participants’ final products by improving backward stages in the production chain. 
The most notable examples include the establishment of a common quality assurance 
lab (aluminium products); the production by the cluster carrier of a basic input of top 
quality (e.g. boilers for solar heaters) which is then bought and used by participating 
firms in the production of their own products; and the provision of a common variety 
of wine for subsequent use (blending with other varieties) by each participant. 
Importantly, the wine cluster carrier has also become a competitor of its participants 
as well, by proceeding to the creation and trading of a new wine label.  
Knowledge creation and productive opportunity 
As mentioned above, the FGIP gathered existing knowledge and also created new. 
Then firms and individuals used it to develop cluster carriers. One of the most 
interesting developments, in our view, is that cluster carriers have also created new 
knowledge that has been used in many instances for further expansion in activities 
other than those originally conceived. That is, individuals and firms have produced, 
through working together and interacting, new knowledge and new capabilities, and at 
the same time have seen the opportunity that both could be used profitably to explore 
new joint production opportunities. The most notable examples are CosmoMarble and 
PressNet, see Pseiridis (2001). The initial objective of the former, for which funding 
was granted, was the expansion of the existing distribution network in foreign 
markets, and especially in China. Then CosmoMarble proceeded to establish a joint 
venture in Shanghai, China (a marble-processing factory),). PressNet is a cluster   27
carrier made up of 6 similar firms (publishers of regional newspapers), and it aimed to 
upgrade newspaper quality and distribution. PressNet developed and provided 
electronic archiving services for newspapers, and is expanding to corporate archiving. 
These few examples point to the inconclusiveness of judging the relative prospects of 
each clustering venture based alone on whether horizontal and/or vertical linkages 
exist. The co-existence of vertical linkages may be facilitatory in some cases (e.g. 
promotion) because the cluster carrier can build on existing strengths of individual 
firms and also induce further specialisation and division of labour. However, the lack 
of vertical linkages might not preclude the possibility of a new division of labour 
based on the relative strengths of each participant. The examination of whether, and to 
what extent, the formation of cluster carriers led to further specialisation and division 
of labour within the cluster carrier’s participants, and whether vertical linkages have 
facilitated specialisation within cluster carriers, could be interesting topics for future 
research. 
The latter observation brings up the issue of cluster “openness”. As funding was given 
to a new firm, the “cluster carrier” remained, mainly owing to its legal shell, relatively 
“closed” to new linkages and additions. We believe that the provision for openness 
should be taken into account in similar initiatives. Further, the creation of clusters 
apparently (to a certain degree) builds on and exploits existing linkages between 
firms; therefore the potential for creation and profitable use of new linkages should be 
added, we suggest, to the selection criteria in subsequent rounds of funding. 
In sum, the FGIP has arguably succeeded in increasing awareness of businesspeople, 
and public sector officials alike on the benefits of clusters. In fact, numerous 
applications for funding came by firms from within the “potential” clusters that were 
identified during the “project”, see Table 2. These firms were eager to initiate a 
clustering venture and thus co-operated to apply for funding. Further, and most 
importantly, the FGIP has arguably been successful in institutionalising clusters as a 
productive possibility for Greek firms, thereby enhancing their productive 
opportunity.  
To summarise, the above suggest that the FGIP, and the subsequent implementation 
of its results regarding support for clusters, can be seen as an example of a reasonably 
successful national policy experiment for the enhancement of productivity and 
competitiveness through clusters, despite limitations. First, the number of 
participating firms has been rather small. Second, more regions should be involved in 
clusters and more inter-cluster linkages sought. Third, there does not seem to be a full 
representation of the potential clusters that were diagnosed by the FGIP, which could 
mean that its results have not been fully exploited. Fourth, numerous cluster carriers 
of the same activity were supported instead of multiple clusters in different activities, 
or instead of a larger one in each activity. Fifth, the cluster carriers in their current 
legal form are quite rigid and cannot easily accommodate inclusion of future member 
firms and/or other linked cluster carriers. Sixth, the size of funds allocated to each 
cluster carrier was quite small, therefore not inviting/facilitating co-operation for 
large-scale investments. Lastly, the administrative requirements imposed on the 
cluster carrier by the Ministry required the dedication of large amounts of resources 
which would be more profitably used in seeking or effectuating (further) co-operation. 
Despite the above limitations, the private sector seems to have welcomed the 
possibility of co-operation and clustering. The concept of clusters is now an integral   28
part of Greek reality and it seems to be a fruitful one. Further, the example of Greece 
currently forms the basis of other projects for the development of clusters. The 
Netwin project (NETWorking for INnovation), which was funded by the EU and was 
run by 6 Business and Innovation Centers (BICs) in Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, France and Greece, is a notable example. Its objective was to diagnose and 
support the development of innovative clusters. Its diagnosis tools have been 
developed on the basis of the Greek experience by the co-ordinator of the FGIP.  
As mentioned above, the adoption of clusters as a policy for competitiveness was 
based on the understanding that clusters may positively affect the determinants of 
productivity and (thus) competitiveness.  
For the case of marble, for example, as shown in Table 3, the volume of Greek marble 
exports to China increased by almost 17,000% in the years 1995-2000. This 
development co-incides with the activities and promotion efforts that were spurred 
with support to the 4 existing clusters. 
Table 4 · Marble exports (volume and value) to China 
  Volume (in tons) 
 Exports  to 
China 




1995 235,000  40,330,013  
1996 206,600  -12.09 38,136,959 -5.44 
1997 1,799,000  770.76 50,113,299 31.40 
1998 2,017,101  12.12 69,042,925 37.77 
1999 8,856,327  339.06 83,101,094 20.36 




Source: Calculated from data from National Statistical Service of Greece  
(SITC 27312) 
To conclude, while it is too early to be decisive, and notwithstanding the problems of 
transferability, clusters as a policy for competitiveness seem to have worked 
reasonably satisfactorily for Greece so far. Therefore, the Greek 
experience/experiment could be used as a model for the development of competitive 
clusters in other countries or regions, in particular less favoured ones. 
MAP HERE 
Map 1 · Regions involved in cluster activities in Greece 
The Map is Courtesy of the Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, The Central 
Libraries at the University of Texas at Austin. 
 
VI Concluding  remarks 
In this chapter we provided a conceptual framework for co-operation and clusters 
based on the insights of Penrose and Richardson. We suggested that co-operation (e.g. 
in the form of clusters) of firms may be seen as an expanded Penrosean firm and   29
hence there can be Penrose-type effects within co-operating firms. More specifically, 
co-operation, apart from enhancing individual firms’ productive opportunities, may 
also create an additional productive opportunity which may be jointly enjoyed by 
participating firms. We also suggested that a crucial element in the selection of co-
operation (à la Richardson) as a profitable productive opportunity is the process of 
acquiring knowledge through experience, which takes place within Penrosean firms 
and Penrose-type entrepreneurs. That is, while Richardson’s insights are useful to 
understand the conditions under which co-operation will be a profitable option, 
Penrose’s theory is crucial in identifying why and how entrepreneurs are able to 
understand when the nature of activities calls for co-operation.  
Further, based on our analysis we attempted to examine how co-operation and clusters 
may affect productivity. Using the “productivity-competitiveness wheel” model as a 
starting point, we examined in more detail the ways that clusters can affect each 
determinant of productivity, identifying some ways that co-operation and clustering 
may positively enhance each one of them. Finally, we used our suggested framework 
to assess the effectiveness of a policy aimed at the promotion and/or creation of 
clusters in Greece. Our discussion tends to suggest that the implementation of this 
policy could be improved if more emphasis was given to: 
1.  Promoting the “openness” of clusters. The formal and informal “entry” of other 
new firms within the shell of a cluster should be facilitated because it would offer 
more opportunities for interaction and competition between firms thus would 
enhance even more the productive opportunity of participating firms and the joint 
productive opportunity.   
2.  Involving larger numbers of firms. The average number of firms in existing 
cluster carriers is quite low to create bring about considerable increases in 
productive possibilities that participating firms see as profitable, can, and are 
willing to take action upon. 
3.  Giving larger amounts of funding in fewer but larger cluster carriers instead of 
funding numerous small ones in the same or in different activities. The support of 
multiple cluster carriers has been very usual in activities such as food, clothing 
and aluminum products. Support for fewer but larger cluster carriers would lead to 
increased competition within participants, hence would provide a stimulus for 
intra-cluster firm specialisation. This, combined with more opportunities for 
interaction between firms, would, in turn, create more productive possibilities for 
participating firms to see and act upon. 
4.  Promoting inter-cluster linkages. For example, the biomass cluster in Thrace 
along with the dairy products one. This would provide more opportunities for 
profitable co-operation across clusters and would thus further enhance both the 
individual and joint productive opportunities.  
However, notwithstanding limitations in implementation, the Greek example can be 
seen as a reasonably successful case of national policy towards the promotion of co-
operation and clusters. We conclude that while it is difficult to replicate (a policy for) 
clusters, an industrial policy for the promotion of clusters looks promising, because 
clusters seem to provide an alternative way to increased productivity and 
competitiveness to that obtained through the promotion of large scale.    30
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